Punishing Women: The Promise and Perils of Contextualized Sentencing for Aboriginal Women in Canada by Williams, Toni
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2007
Punishing Women: The Promise and Perils of
Contextualized Sentencing for Aboriginal Women
in Canada
Toni Williams
Kent Law School, U.K.
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Toni Williams, Punishing Women: The Promise and Perils of Contextualized Sentencing for Aboriginal Women in Canada, 55 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 269 (2007)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss3/3
 269 
THE 2006 FRIEDMAN & GILBERT  
CRIMINAL JUSTICE FORUM 
PUNISHING WOMEN: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF 
CONTEXTUALIZED SENTENCING FOR                        
ABORIGINAL WOMEN IN CANADA 
TONI WILLIAMS∗ 
 
 I. SOCIAL CONTEXTUALIZATION IN THE SENTENCING 
  PROCESS............................................................................... 272 
 II. 1996 SENTENCING REFORMS ............................................... 273 
 A. Rationales .................................................................... 273 
 B. The Reforms ................................................................. 275 
 C. The Impact of the Sentencing Reforms ........................ 278 
 III. CONCLUSION........................................................................ 286 
 
The last twenty-five years marked an era of rapid and dramatic change in 
criminal justice policy as states throughout the industrialized world embarked on 
reforms intended radically to restructure aspects of criminalization and crime control 
practice. During this era, decisions about punishment—what kind, how much, and 
under what conditions—came under intense professional and popular scrutiny. The 
attacks of the early 1970s on the “lawlessness” of indeterminate sentencing, 
primarily because of the role played by judges’ personal views and the resulting 
                                                                 
∗
 Toni Williams holds a chair in law at Kent Law School in the UK. This essay was 
written while I was a faculty member at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto 
Canada, and chair-elect at Kent Law School.  It is a revised version of a lecture delivered in 
the Criminal Justice Law Forum of Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State 
University, on November 14, 2006.  In seeking to retain the more direct and informal tone of a 
lecture, I have pared down the footnotes to a minimum and tried to avoid including 
unnecessary information and claims.  The lecture builds on an article that I have published 
with Sonia Lawrence, which is entitled Swallowed Up: Drug Couriers at the Borders of 
Canadian Sentencing, and draws extensively on a chapter titled “Intersectionality analysis in 
the sentencing of Aboriginal women in Canada: what difference does it make” in a 
forthcoming book titled Law, Power and the Politics of Subjectivity: Intersectionality and 
Beyond.  See Sonia N. Lawrence & Toni Williams, Swallowed Up: Drug Couriers at the 
Borders of Canadian Sentencing, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 285 (2006); DAVINA COOPER ET AL., 
INTERSECTIONALITY AND BEYOND: LAW, POWER AND THE POLITICS OF LOCATION (forthcoming 
2008).  Thanks to Jarvis Hétu, LLB class of 2008, Osgoode Hall Law School, for his excellent 
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the sentencing of black women convicted of importing drugs, and I would like to thank Sonia 
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judicial proceedings.  I am responsible for any remaining errors.  I welcome your comments at 
G.A.Williams@kent.ac.uk.  
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extreme disparity of outcomes,1 and on the failures of rehabilitative sanctions to 
achieve their goals, eroded confidence in the legitimacy of established practices.2 
With the breakdown of old ways of thinking about and performing punishment, 
space appeared to reform sentencing processes: to re-examine who makes critical 
decisions about sanctions, how they are made and what factors influence them.  
Seizing the opportunity for change, reformers have shifted decision-making 
power from judges to legislators and prosecutors; they have restructured old 
punishments and introduced new ones, intended to meet complex and often 
inconsistent goals.3 Notable innovations include the transformation of complainants 
into “victims” and the apparent empowerment of this new juridical subject with 
standing and participation rights in sentencing and parole hearings; the re-emergence 
of penal practices that link criminality more to character than to capacity,4 and the 
development or, perhaps revival, of a risk-based model of law enforcement practice. 
This forward-looking probabilistic model draws on actuarial methods to define risk 
pools and profiling to populate them. Its focus is prediction of future behavior and 
management of problematized populations rather than a particularized response to an 
instance of individual wrongdoing.5 
Superficially, at least, it appears that Canada’s main sentencing reforms of the 
past ten years have little connection with the development of actuarialism and the 
emergence of risk-based governance of criminal justice.6 Changes to the sentencing 
regime ostensibly were intended to stem an increase in imprisonment that had 
occurred during the 1980s and early 1990s. In this respect, Canadian policies differ 
from those of similar states such as the United Kingdom, Australia and, of course, 
the United States, where sentencing reform has contributed to an extraordinary 
                                                                 
1See generally JOHN HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PROCESS (1971); Marvin E. 
Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972); Michael Mandel, Rethinking 
Parole, 13 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 501 (1975).   
2See generally SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES (Michael Tonry & 
Richard S. Frase eds., 2001) [hereinafter SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS]; Robert Martinson, 
What works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974); Robert 
Martinson, New findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 243 (1979). 
3See generally SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS, supra note 2; SENTENCING REFORM IN 
OVERCROWDED TIMES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad 
eds., 1997) [hereinafter SENTENCING REFORM]. 
4For historical analysis of changing conceptions of responsibility in criminal law, see 
generally Nicola Lacey, Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 249 
(2001); Nicola Lacey, In Search of the Responsible Subject: History, Philosophy and Social 
Sciences in Criminal Law Theory, 64 MOD. L. REV. 350 (2001). 
5See generally Malcolm M. Feeley, Entrepreneurs of Punishment: The Legacy of 
Privatization, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 321 (2002); Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, 
The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30  
CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992); Pat O’Malley, Globalizing Risk? Distinguishing Styles of “Neo-
liberal” Criminal Justice in Australia and the USA, 2 CRIM. JUST. 205 (2002).    
6See generally O’Malley, supra note 5 (providing thoughtful analysis of different modes 
of risk-based governance and a critique of claims that full-bodied actuarialism has been 
exported from the United States to other Western countries). 
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“imprisonment binge.”7  A decline in Canada’s total incarceration rate suggests that 
the reforms may have gone some way toward achieving the objectives of less 
reliance on the prison, but further analysis shows significant and troubling variations 
among different populations, with Aboriginal women being imprisoned 
disproportionately and at higher rates than in the past.8 This finding is consistent with 
evidence elsewhere that the imprisonment of women has risen rapidly and 
substantially during the past two decades; however, jurisdictions reporting such 
increases typically have deliberately chosen to expand the role of imprisonment 
within their repertoire of penal sanctions. Growth in the incarceration of women in 
those places may be lamentable but it is not unexpected. Since Canada has made the 
opposite policy choice—and appears to have implemented it with some success—
questions arise about why women from its most marginalized population have fared 
so poorly. 
This article examines the failure of the reforms to remedy the over-incarceration 
of Aboriginal woman through exploration of a sentencing methodology that judges 
may employ to give effect to the reforms: the social contextualization of women’s 
lawbreaking. Social context analysis developed as a critique of how the state controls 
and punishes women and as a way to expose failures of justice.9 More recently, 
commentators have suggested that the insertion of social context analysis into the 
sentencing process might allow courts to find new and more robust justifications for 
lowering the penalties they impose on women lawbreakers from marginalized 
                                                                 
7See SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS, supra note 2 (providing discussion of comparative 
sentencing reform); see also MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (2d ed. 2006); JOHN IRWIN 
& JAMES AUSTIN, IT’S ABOUT TIME: AMERICA’S IMPRISONMENT BINGE (2d ed. 1997).  The per 
capita incarceration rate in the United States is the highest of any country able to report such 
data.  See INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUD., ENTIRE WORLD—PRISON POPULATION RATES PER 
100,000 OF THE NAT’L POPULATION, http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/rel/icps/worldbrief/ 
highest_to_lowest_rates.php (then select “Entire World;” then select “Prison population 
rates”) (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).  At least two million men and women are incarcerated in 
prisons and jails and another five million are subject to the correctional supervision while on 
probation or parole.  See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT. 
CORRECTIONAL SURVEYS,, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/corr2tab.htm (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2007).  People of African ancestry are vastly over-represented among 
prisoners and those under correctional supervision, along with other minorities.  See The 
Sentencing Project: Research and Advocacy for Reform, http://www.sentencingproject.org 
(then follow “Racial Disparity” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).  For data on prison and 
correctional supervision populations in the United States, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT. 
CORRECTIONAL SURVEYS., supra (providing data from 1980 through 2005).  For up-to-date 
commentary and analysis of United States sentencing data, see generally The Sentencing 
Project Home Page, http://www.sentencingproject.org (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).  For 
specific, up-to-date data see THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES: 
THIRTY-THREE CONSECUTIVE YEARS OF GROWTH (2006), http://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
Admin%5CDocuments%5Cpublications%5Cinc_newfigures.pdf.   
8See infra Part II.C. 
9See generally Sonia N. Lawrence & Toni Williams, Swallowed Up: Drug Couriers at the 
Borders of Canadian Sentencing, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 285 (2006) (providing more in depth 
discussion of social context analysis in relation to criminalization of women). 
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communities.10 This article also considers whether the emergence of risk as a 
rationale for penal intervention and control has made it more difficult for judges to 
realize the promise of contextualized analysis as a foundation for less harsh 
sentencing of Aboriginal women.  
I.  SOCIAL CONTEXTUALIZATION IN THE SENTENCING PROCESS 
Contextualized sentencing is not a term of art, but rather a label for the particular 
ways in which sentencing policy and practice may respond to feminist, anti-colonial 
and anti-racist critiques of criminal justice processes and decision-making. With 
respect to female lawbreakers, social context analysis engages with one of the more 
enduring and consistent observations about criminal justice—that, although crime is 
highly gendered as a male occupation, a very small number of women whose 
circumstances seem very similar are consistently found in criminal courts and 
prisons.11 Historically, the small number of women in the criminal justice system 
tended to be overlooked, attracting little scholarly attention and having virtually no 
impact on how officials thought about responding to crime and managing 
punishment.12 Consequently, mainstream penal practices and institutions, although 
presented as neutral and of universal application, were developed on the basis of 
gendered theories of lawbreaking, theories that assume male agency.  
Social context analysis seeks to explain the apparently atypical behavior of 
women who break the law by situating women’s crimes in the social settings of 
women’s lives, linking their offending to vulnerabilities attributable to the oppressive 
                                                                 
10See, e.g., BETH E. RICHIE, COMPELLED TO CRIME: THE GENDER ENTRAPMENT OF 
BATTERED BLACK WOMEN (1996); Eda Katharine Tinto, Note, The Role of Gender and 
Relationship in Reforming the Rockefeller Drug Laws, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 906 (2001). 
11Although some of the gaps between recorded instances of male and female participation 
are smaller now than in the past, women still comprise only about one in five adults charged in 
Canada, about one in ten admissions to provincial/territorial prisons, and one in twenty 
admissions to federal prisons.  See CAN. CTR. FOR JUST. STAT., CANADIAN CRIME STATISTICS 
2002 (2003), available at http://dsp-psd.communication.gc.ca/Pilot/Statcan/85-205-
XIE/0000285-205-XIE.pdf; CAN. CTR. FOR JUST. STAT., ADULT CORRECTIONAL SERVICES IN 
CANADA, 2001-2002 (2003), available at http://dsp-psd.communication.gc.ca/Collection-
R/Statcan/85-211-XIE/0000285-211-XIE.pdf; PUB. SAFETY & EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
PORTFOLIO CORRECTIONS STAT. COMM., CORRECTIONS AND CONDITIONAL RELEASE 
STATISTICAL OVERVIEW: 2003 (2003) (on file with author).   
12The outpouring of official and critical literature on women offenders in the last twenty 
years shows how much that situation has changed.  See MEDA CHESNEY-LIND, THE FEMALE 
OFFENDER: GIRLS, WOMEN, AND CRIME, 1-8 (1997); Mary E. Gilfus, From Victims to 
Survivors to Offenders: Women’s Routes of Entry and Immersion Into Street Crime, 4 WOMEN 
& CRIM. JUST. 63 (1992); Judith Rumgay, Policies of Neglect: Female Offenders and the 
Probation Service, in USER INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL CARE: RESEARCH 
INFORMING PRACTICE 193, 193 (Hazel Kemshall & Rosemary Littlechild eds., 2000); 
DEBORAH R. BASKIN & IRA B. SOMMERS, CASUALTIES OF COMMUNITY DISORDER: WOMEN’S 
CAREERS IN VIOLENT CRIME (1998).  For an overview of the literature, see also Darrell 
Steffensmeier & Emilie Allan, Gender and Crime: Toward a Gendered Theory of Female 
Offending, 22 ANN. REV. SOC. 459 (1996); KELLY HANNAH-MOFFAT, PUNISHMENT IN 
DISGUISE: PENAL GOVERNANCE AND FEDERAL IMPRISONMENT OF WOMEN IN CANADA (2000); 
TASK FORCE ON FEDERALLY SENTENCED WOMEN, CREATING CHOICES (1990), http://www.csc-
scc.gc.ca/text/prgrm/fsw/choices/toce_e.shtml.  
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social relations, exclusionary social practices and victimization. Thus, advocates of 
social context analysis argue that women’s lawbreaking tends to be differently 
motivated than that of men: driven by need not greed, a product of fear and the 
instinct to protect self or child rather than aggression. Because of these 
characteristics of her offending, the female lawbreaker has been considered less 
dangerous than the male; she is thought less likely to need penal sanctions to 
communicate society’s disgust for her conduct and to create incentives toward good 
behavior and more likely to respond to socially inclusionary and reintegrative 
measures than to correctional interventions premised on exclusion from society. In 
addition to these claims about the futility or unsuitability of imprisonment, the social 
context theorists might point to women’s responsibilities for primary care of children 
and elders, one effect of which is that the relational losses and social costs of 
imprisoning women are substantial.  
If the reactive, defensive, or protective nature of women’s crime serves as a 
foundation for social context analysis, sentencing factors, such as those that mitigate 
penalty, ostensibly offer the means to integrate a contextualized account of a 
woman’s offense into the sentencing process.13 Judges are accustomed to adjusting 
penalties by reference to the circumstances of the offense and the exigencies of 
defendants’ lives. While judges have traditionally considered circumstances deemed 
immediate and pressing or sought to reward defendants for their co-operation with 
the criminal process, the social conditions of a defendant’s life, such as his standing 
in the community or positive employment history, also may function to reduce 
sanction severity.14 Such willingness to consider factors unrelated to culpability 
suggests that the sentencing process should be able to accommodate and respond 
progressively to claims about the significance of a woman’s social context to her 
offending behavior. But not all contextual factors operate in the same way. In 
particular, an individual’s experience of hardship or needs may be subordinated to 
the perceived demands of social protection if that hardship or need is constituted as a 
risk, as in effect situating the individual among the “dangerous classes.”15  
II.  1996 SENTENCING REFORMS 
A.  Rationales 
In September 1996, Canada enacted a new sentencing regime when amendments 
to part XXIII of the Criminal Code came into effect.16 These amendments responded 
                                                                 
13See, e.g., Lawrence & Williams, supra note 9; ELIZABETH COMACK & GILLIAN BALFOUR, 
THE POWER TO CRIMINALIZE: VIOLENCE, INEQUALITY AND THE LAW (2004).  
14See generally ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 151-80 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 4th ed. 2005). 
15See generally JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON: 
IDEOLOGY, CLASS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (6th ed. 2001); Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Criminogenic 
Needs and the Transformative Risk Subject: Hybridizations of Risk/Need in Penality, 7 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 29 (2005); Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Empowering Risk: The Nature of 
Gender-Responsive Strategies, in CRIMINALIZING WOMEN: GENDER AND (IN)JUSTICE IN NEO-
LIBERAL TIMES 250 (Gillian Balfour & Elizabeth Comack eds., 2006) [hereinafter 
Empowering Risk]. 
16See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46 (1985). 
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to three main concerns about established practices: the broad scope of judicial 
discretion at sentencing; general over-use of incarceration as a penal sanction; and 
the disproportionate representation of Aboriginal people in Canadian prisons.  
Sentencing law in Canada had historically shown considerable deference to 
sentencing judges, offering them virtually no guidance and demanding little by way 
of accountability. Parliament established maximum and (more rarely) minimum 
sanctions for offenses, but judges played the primary role in deciding general policy 
matters such as the goals of sentencing and the importance of various goals to 
penalization of different offenses as well as the more specific questions about the 
application of goals and selection of sanction in relation to a particular 
offense/offender dyad.17 By the mid-1990s, a pincer movement of political demands 
for more accountability in sentencing and experts committed to modernizing the 
criminal justice system had discredited the lack of transparency and inconsistent 
decision-making of Canadian sentencing practices. Criticism of these weaknesses by 
an independent commission of inquiry, parliamentary committees, academics and 
practitioners gave rise to reform proposals that were intended to provide a consistent 
framework of sentencing policy and practice, enhance democratic accountability, and 
improve public access to sentencing law.18  
Reforms that targeted the general over-use of imprisonment were fueled by 
administrative, fiscal and political concerns.19 During the early to mid-1990s, Canada 
reported high incarceration rates relative to those of other Western democratic states. 
For example, according to one often-repeated statistic a 1995 imprisonment rate of 
132 per 100,000 of its adult population ranked Canada as the third most punitive 
nation among a group of fifteen comparator states.20 More important than a data 
point from a single year was the growth in the prison population during the early 
1990s, a growth that seemed inconsistent with falling rates of police-recorded crime 
and a declining number of criminally-charged adults.21 Absent any plausible claim of 
a causal relationship between sanction severity and crime rate, this combination of 
less crime and harsher punishments challenged the Canadian state in at least two 
ways. Symbolically, the large and growing prison population conflicted with 
                                                                 
17See generally MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING (Julian V. Roberts & David P. Cole eds., 
1999) (providing useful essays on sentencing in Canada); Anthony N. Doob, Sentencing 
Reform in Canada, in SENTENCING REFORM, supra note 3, at 168.  
18This history is briefly outlined in David Daubney & Gordon Parry, An Overview of Bill 
C-41 (The Sentencing Reform Act), in MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING, supra note 17, at 31.  
19
 UB. SAFETY CAN., CORRECTIONS POPULATION GROWTH: FIRST REPORT ON PROGRESS FOR 
FEDERAL/PROVINCIAL/TERRITORIAL MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR JUSTICE (1997), available at 
http://ww2.ps-sp.gc.ca/publications/corrections/pdf/corr_pop_growth_1997_e.pdf. 
20CORR. STAT. COMM., CORRECTIONS AND CONDITIONAL RELEASE STATISTICAL OVERVIEW: 
2005 (2005) (on file with author). 
21From 1991 to 1995, the police-recorded crime rate dropped by 13%, and the number of 
adults charged fell by 15%. Over the same period, however, admissions to federal and 
provincial prisons grew by 15% and the incarceration rate of charged persons increased by 
36%.  CORR. STAT. COMM., CORRECTIONS AND CONDITIONAL RELEASE STATISTICAL 
OVERVIEW: 2006 (2006), available at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cor/rep/_fl/FINAL 
%20English%20CCRSO%202006.pdf [hereinafter RELEASE STATISTICAL OVERVIEW: 2006]. 
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Canada’s sense of itself and its place in the world as a beacon of progressive social 
policy. More pragmatically, by the mid-1990s, correctional administrators and 
political elites had begun to view imprisonment as an expensive and ineffective form 
of crime control.22 
Unlike countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, Canada did 
not embark on large-scale expansion of its prisons for men, although it did increase 
the number of spaces available for federally incarcerated women. Rapid expansion of 
the number of prisoners therefore exerted considerable pressure on the prison estate, 
creating unsafe and unpleasant living and working environments. In an era of 
stringent fiscal restraint, reducing reliance on a costly, ineffective institution such as 
imprisonment presented itself as a rational political choice. 
Less pervasive but perhaps more entrenched than the general problem of over-
reliance on incarceration was Canada’s record of incarcerating Aboriginal people at 
much higher rates than non-Aboriginal people, a record that by the mid-1990s was 
well-documented and incontrovertible. One influential late 1980s study reported, for 
example, that Aboriginal people, then about 2% of the national population, 
constituted about 10% of the federal prison population.23  Focusing specifically on 
the over-representation of Aboriginal women among prisoners, one study showed 
that in the early 1990s, when Aboriginal people amounted to about 3% of the 
Canadian population, Aboriginal women accounted for 11% of all female prisoners 
in the federal system, and “nearly half” of the women admitted to provincial 
prisons.24 
B.  The Reforms 
Several aspects of the 1996 reforms respond to the problems of untrammeled 
judicial discretion and over-use of incarceration: a statutory statement of the purpose 
and principles of sentencing purports to guide judges;25 a statutory duty to give 
reasons for sentence seeks to enhance transparency;26 and codified considerations for 
decision-making include parity.27 As well as refining the decision-making 
procedures, Parliament enacted changes relating to sanctions. It enabled diversion of 
                                                                 
22See PUB. SAFETY CAN., supra note 19. 
23See Michael Jackson, Locking up Natives in Canada, 23 U.BRIT.COLUM. L. REV. 215, 
215 (1989).  In the Prairie region of the country, which has a relatively large Aboriginal 
population, the over-representation was much worse.  Estimated to comprise about 6% of the 
general population of Manitoba and Saskatchewan, Aboriginal people amounted to 46% of 
admissions to provincial prisons in Manitoba and a staggering 66% of provincial prison 
admissions in Saskatchewan.  Id. at 216.  For a more recent review and synthesis of empirical 
and policy literatures on over-incarceration of Aboriginal peoples in Canada, see ROYAL 
COMM’N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE: A REPORT ON 
ABORIGINAL PEOPLE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CANADA (1996) [hereinafter RCAP]. 
24CAROL LAPRAIRIE, EXAMINING ABORIGINAL CORRECTIONS IN CANADA 33-34 (1996), 
available at http://ww2.ps-sp.gc.ca/publications/abor_corrections/199614_e.pdf. 
25Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 718 (1985). 
26Id. § 726.2. 
27Id. § 718.2(b). 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007
276 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:269 
adult defendants,28 modified the procedures governing the use of the fine to reduce 
the risk of imprisonment for default,29 and created a new sanction—the conditional 
sentence—which suspends execution of a prison term of less than two years.30 Other 
measures intended generally to reduce the use of incarceration appear in the adoption 
of objectives that ostensibly represent a restorative model of justice alongside more 
established retributive, deterrent, and rehabilitative goals,31 and the inclusion of two 
parsimony or restraint provisions among the factors judges must consider when 
making decisions. One such provision, § 718.2(d), is uncontroversial: few object to 
the proposition that judges consider not incarcerating defendants when “less 
restrictive sanctions may be appropriate.” Section 718.2(e), by contrast, has proven 
highly contentious. This provision states that “all available sanctions other than 
imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all 
offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.”  
R. v. Gladue, the first Canadian Supreme Court decision on any aspect of the new 
sentencing regime, presented an opportunity for the Court to interpret § 718.2(e) and 
to guide judges as to its application.32 The decision concerned an appeal from a three 
year prison term imposed on a young Aboriginal woman convicted of manslaughter 
after killing an emotionally, and sometimes physically, abusive common law 
spouse.33 The sentencing judge had taken into account a wide range of mitigating 
factors, but held that there were no special circumstances to bring § 718.2(e) into 
play because the defendant and victim lived in an urban setting not on-reserve and 
                                                                 
28Id. § 717. 
29Id. §§ 734-734.8, 736. 
30Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 742-742.7.  This sanction closely resembles 
probation, the primary form of which in Canada suspends the passing of sentence.  Id. § 731.  
During the ten years since enactment of the 1996 reforms, the courts have sought to 
distinguish the two sanctions more sharply, both to facilitate administration of the new 
sentencing regime and also to buttress the legitimacy of the prison term served in the 
community.  To this end, the courts have developed a norm of attaching punitive conditions to 
the conditional sentence, while maintaining that the conditions attached to a probation order 
should be primarily rehabilitative.  A second difference between the two sanctions is the 
presumption that breach of a conditional sentence results in the defendant spending the 
remainder of the term in a prison; breach of probation order is a criminal offense in Canada, 
but it does not automatically result in a prison sentence. As an attempted safeguard against the 
possibility of a net-widening effect, in the sense of courts ordering the relatively severe 
penalty of a suspended prison term when the less restrictive measure of probation is 
appropriate, a judge may not impose a conditional sentence without first determining that the 
appropriate sanction is a prison term of up to two years. After making that decision, the judge 
then considers whether the defendant may serve her sentence in the community rather than in 
an institution, taking into account at this point matters such as the risk that the defendant’s 
freedom may pose to the community and consistency with the new statutory sentencing 
objectives and principles. R. v. Proulx, [2000] 140 CCC (3d) 449 (SCC). 
31Id.  § 718 (1985). 
32R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (Can.).   
33There is more discussion of the history of abuse in the Court of Appeal decision than in 
the Supreme Court’s decision.  See R. v. Gladue, [1997] 98 B.C.A.C. 120, ¶¶ 36-42 (Can.).      
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therefore were not “‘within the Aboriginal community as such.’”34 On appeal, the 
defendant challenged, inter alia, the underlying assumptions about authentic 
Aboriginal experience that this view seemed to reflect.  
The Court interpreted the reach of § 718.2(e) expansively, holding that it “applies 
to all Aboriginal persons wherever they reside, whether on- or off-reserve, in a large 
city or a rural area.”35 More generally, it articulated the twin purposes of the section 
as establishing a general norm that imprisonment “should be the penal sanction of 
last resort,” reducing over-incarceration of Aboriginal persons.36 When determining a 
sentence, judges should interpret the section “as Parliament’s direction to members 
of the judiciary to inquire into the causes of the problem [of over-incarceration of 
Aboriginal people] and to endeavor to remedy it, to the extent that a remedy is 
possible through the sentencing process.”37  
According to the Court, the justification for judges playing this remedial role is 
not that judges cause over-representation of Aboriginal people in prison by 
performing sentencing in a discriminatory manner. While acknowledging that there 
is some evidence of “an unfortunate institutional approach that is more inclined to 
refuse bail and to impose more and longer prison terms for Aboriginal offenders,”38 
the Court regards over-representation as primarily attributable to “dislocation” and 
“economic [under-] development” of the Aboriginal society.39 Even if judicial 
decisions are not the primary reason for over-representation, however, the power of 
sentencing judges over sanctions positions them to play a limited part in “remedying 
injustice against Aboriginal peoples in Canada.”40 To exercise this power effectively, 
judges must adopt a “different methodology,” based on § 718.2(e), whenever they 
sentence an Aboriginal defendant.41  
For the purposes of this “different methodology,” judges must consider “[t]he 
unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in bringing the 
particular Aboriginal offender before the courts . . . and . . . [what] types of 
sentencing procedures . . . [are] appropriate . . . for the offender . . . [given] her 
particular Aboriginal heritage or connection.”42 “Unique systemic or background 
factors” refers to the history and contemporary social context of Aboriginal people’s 
lives, and, more particularly, to how the effects of that context may have contributed 
to the defendant’s offending. The Court classifies knowledge of the general 
consequences for Aboriginal persons and communities of Canada’s colonial history 
as within the realm of judicial notice,43 but requires specific evidence of the 
                                                                 
34Gladue, 1 S.C.R. 688, ¶18. 
35Id. ¶ 93, pt. 11. 
36Id. ¶ 36. 
37Id. ¶ 64. 
38Id. ¶ 65. 
39Gladue, 1 S.C.R. 688, ¶ 67. 
40Id. ¶65. 
41Id. ¶ 71-74. 
42Id. ¶ 66. 
43The Court does not use the term “colonialism.”  Id. ¶ 69. 
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relationships between such consequences and the defendant’s appearance before the 
court, evidence of the defendant’s experiences of abuse and victimization, 
discrimination, poverty, unemployment, substance abuse, family and community 
fragmentation and so on.  A judge who finds that such experiences have contributed 
significantly to the defendant’s appearance before the court must then consider if 
imprisonment is capable of communicating deterrence or denunciation to the 
defendant and her Aboriginal community, or if a sentence oriented toward healing 
and based on the new restorative justice objectives would be more meaningful and 
appropriate.44  
Thus, the Gladue decision essentially requires judges to consider the social 
context of an Aboriginal defendant when passing sentence and assumes that such 
consideration makes it less likely that an Aboriginal defendant will receive a prison 
sentence. It also holds that where a judge concludes that a prison term is necessary, 
social context might help justify a shorter sentence as fit.45 Other aspects of the 
decision, by contrast, reveal ambivalence about the substantive equality project of 
sentencing Aboriginal people differently to reduce their over-incarceration. The 
Court expresses this ambivalence most clearly when it indicates that the sanctions 
imposed on Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal defendants convicted of more serious 
offenses should not differ much, if at all, in type or duration regardless of whether 
incarceration effectively communicates a punitive objective to the defendant and her 
Aboriginal community.46 This position apparently restricts the scope of § 718.2(e) to 
less serious offenses—those where one might perhaps expect judges to justify non-
carceral sanctions without resorting to a special methodology for decision-making.  
 
C.  The Impact of the Sentencing Reforms 
Section 718.2(e) and the Gladue decision were hailed by some commentators as 
“an important watershed in Canadian criminal law,”47 and criticized by others for 
allegedly making faulty assumptions about the causes of Aboriginal over-
representation and adopting a “reverse discrimination” methodology to favor 
Aboriginal defendants.48 Another response expressed skepticism about the viability 
of the new sentencing methodology, questioning the willingness or ability of judges 
to apply it to Aboriginal defendants.49 Notwithstanding their very different 
                                                                 
44Gladue, 1 S.C.R. 688. ¶ 69. 
45Id. ¶ 79. 
46Id.  ¶ 33, ¶¶ 78-79; see also R. v. Wells, [2000] 141 C.C.C. 3d 368,   ¶ 42. 
47Mary-Ellen Turpel-Lafond, Sentencing Within a Restorative Justice Paradigm: 
Procedural Implications of R. v. Gladue, 43 CRIM. L. Q. 34, 35 (1999); See also Jonathan 
Rudin & Kent Roach, Broken Promises: A Response to Stenning and Roberts’ Empty 
Promises, 65 SASK. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002).   
48Philip Stenning & Julian V. Roberts, Empty Promises: Parliament, The Supreme Court, 
and the Sentencing of Aboriginal Offenders, 64 SASK. L. REV. 137, 161 (2001). 
49See Susan Haslip, Aboriginal Sentencing Reform in Canada—Prospects for Success: 
Standing Tall With Both Feet Planted Firmly in the Air, 7 MURDOCK U. ELECTRONIC J. L. 1 
(2000), http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v7n1/haslip71.html; Dawn Y. Anderson, 
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conclusions on the legitimacy of § 718.2(e) as a remedy for the over-incarceration of 
Aboriginal persons, detractors and supporters alike tend to assume that the new 
sentencing regime has the intended effect of reducing the incarceration of Aboriginal 
defendants relative to the past and relative to the incarceration of non-Aboriginal 
persons.  
Data on the use of imprisonment in the last ten years do not support this 
assumption, as is illustrated by comparison of changes in the total imprisonment rate 
with changes in the incarceration of Aboriginal women. Canada has significantly 
reduced its reliance on incarceration since enactment of the sentencing reforms, 
cutting the adult incarceration rate from 132 prisoners per 100,000 adults in 1995, to 
107 per 100,000 in 2006, a drop of almost 20%.50 This finding indicates that changes 
in sentencing policy and practice may have had the intended effect on the size of the 
prison population, a noteworthy achievement when most comparator states have 
increased their incarceration rates and prison populations.51  
In contrast to this downward trend, however, the number of Aboriginal women—
and men—in prisons has increased. The data show, first, that the last ten years has 
witnessed a much larger rise in the number of federally incarcerated Aboriginal 
women than non-Aboriginal women in federal institutions. Specifically, the 
Aboriginal female population of the federal prisons has doubled, (from 64 women in 
1996 to 128 women in 2006) since 1996, whereas the non-Aboriginal female 
population has increased by 14%, (from 244 women to 280 women).52 As a result of 
this difference, Aboriginal women represented close to one in three (31%) federal 
female prisoners in 2006, up from one in five (21%) in 1996.53  
Relatively few women lawbreakers receive federal prison terms, however, since 
these are reserved for the most serious offenses and offenders.  In relation to changes 
in the populations of provincial prisons, there are substantial differences between 
                                                          
After Gladue: Are Judges Sentencing Aboriginal Offenders Differently? (2004) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, York University) (on file with author). 
50RELEASE STATISTICAL OVERVIEW: 2006, supra note 21, at 5; ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. 
FOR PRISON STUD., WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 3 (2007), http://www.kcl.ac.uk/ 
/depsta/rel/icps/world-prison-pop-seventh.pdf. 
51Note that Anthony Doob and Cheryl Webster argue that long-term data essentially show 
stability in Canadian incarceration rates for the past forty years.  Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl 
Marie Webster, Countering Punitiveness: Understanding Stability in Canada's Imprisonment 
Rate, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 325, 326 (2006).  Their analysis raises questions about the urgent 
need for change expressed by correctional administrators during the early to mid-1990s.  Id. at 
327.  They also point to a dramatic shift away from sentencing towards remand custody more 
recently.  Id. at 352-53.  Thus, a drop in the use of imprisonment post-conviction may indicate 
that more defendants are receiving non-custodial sanctions at sentencing because they have 
already served their prison terms on remand.  Id. at 353.  
52See ROBERTA LYNN SINCLAIR & ROGER BOE, CANADIAN FEDERAL WOMEN OFFENDER 
PROFILES: TRENDS FROM 1981 TO 2002 (REVISED) (2002), at 46, http://www.csc-
scc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/reports/r131/r131_e.pdf (providing statistics from 1996); RELEASE 
STATISTICAL OVERVIEW: 2006, supra note 21, at 58 (providing statistics from 2006). 
53See SINCLAIR & BOE, supra note 52, at 46; RELEASE STATISTICAL OVERVIEW: 2006, 
supra note 21, at 58.  Federal imprisonment of Aboriginal men has also increased since the 
1996 reforms, although not to the same extent.   RELEASE STATISTICAL OVERVIEW: 2006, supra 
note 21, at 58.   
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Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal admissions to both sentenced and remand custody. 
Specifically, the number of Aboriginal women admitted to sentenced custody in 
provincial/territorial prisons has not declined to the same extent as has the number of 
non-Aboriginal women in provincial/territorial custody,54 and the remand admission 
rates of Aboriginal women across the country have increased even more rapidly than 
other remand admissions.55 Thus, ten years after enactment of sentencing reforms 
designed to reduce incarceration, and eight years after Gladue characterized the 
reforms as a remedy for over–incarceration of Aboriginal persons, Aboriginal 
women are still over-represented in both federal and provincial prisons. Moreover, 
the extent of that over-representation has worsened: there are now more Aboriginal 
women in federal and provincial/territorial prisons (including remand prisons) than 
before the reforms; Aboriginal women represent a much higher proportion of women 
prisoners than before the changes; and they are significantly more over-represented 
in Canadian prisons than are Aboriginal men.  
The contradiction between a declining total incarceration rate and increasing 
imprisonment of Aboriginal women raises questions about how judges apply  
§ 718.2(e) and Gladue’s remedial sentencing methodology and why the results are so 
unfavorable to Aboriginal women.56 Analysis of recent sentencing decisions 
                                                                 
54In 1994-95, the 2,447 sentenced Aboriginal women admitted to provincial and territorial 
prisons accounted for about one in five (21%) of all female admissions, while the 2,123 
Aboriginal women admitted in 2003-04 accounted more than one in four (29%) of all female 
admissions sentenced to custody in provincial/territorial prisons.  Jodi-Anne Brzozowski et al., 
Victimization and Offending Among the Aboriginal Population in Canada, 26 STAT. CAN. 1, 28 
(2006).  More specifically, the data show that the number of Aboriginal women admitted to 
sentenced custody in Canada’s provinces and territories dropped during the first few years 
after the 1996 reforms (from 2,447 in 1994-95 to 1,894 in 2000-01, a 23% decline), but began 
to climb in 2001-02, shortly after the Gladue decision, reaching 2,123 in 2003-04, an increase 
of 12%.  Id.  Aboriginal men constituted 21% of admissions to sentenced custody in the 
provinces and territories.  Karen Beattie, Adult Correctional Services in Canada, 2004/2005, 
26 STAT. CAN. 1, 17 (2006).  
55Remand imprisonment has increased substantially in Canada since the mid 1990s. Once 
again, Aboriginal women have fared badly, with almost twice as many admitted to remand 
custody (2,751) in 2003-04 as in 1995-96 (1,403).  Brzozowski, supra note 54, at 28. 
Aboriginal women represented 23% of adult female admissions to remand custody, up from 
14% in 1995-96.  Id.  Remand decision-making is not based on the same factors as sentencing, 
and, in theory, detention before sentencing ought to reduce the likelihood or the length of 
carceral sentences.  Empirical studies have shown, however, that individuals incarcerated 
before trial are more likely to receive prison sentences than those convicted of the same 
offenses but released on bail.  See, e.g., JOANNA KERR, CAN. FOUND. FOR DRUG POL’Y REPORT 
OF THE COMMISSION ON SYSTEMIC RACISM IN THE ONTARIO CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 275 
(1995).  The quantitative data presented here do not show interactions between imprisonment 
decisions taken at different stages, but the high levels of both remand and sentenced 
incarceration of Aboriginal women indicates that other factors conducive to incarceration at 
sentencing tend to outweigh the discount that courts apply for time served. 
56Note that Anderson’s study, based on cases decided up to 2003, found that judges often 
did not apply § 728.2(e) either because they did not have the necessary information before 
them or because they did not think that the defendant’s Aboriginal ancestry was sufficiently 
authentic to invoke § 718.2(e).  See Anderson, supra note 49.  Sentencing appeals, such as in 
R. v. Kakekagamick, indicate that compliance with the Gladue methodology is far from 
universal.  See R. v. Kakekagamick, C43843, [2006] O.J. No. 3346 (O.C.A. Feb. 24, 2006), 
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involving Aboriginal women illuminates some of the perils as well as the promise of 
resorting to social context analysis in this setting. The following table summarizes 
recent first instance cases in which an Aboriginal woman was sentenced for an 
offence that caused death or injury. Of these fourteen decisions, five resulted in a 
federal prison term of at least two years, one in a provincial prison term of eighteen 
months, seven imposed conditional sentences and one case imposed probation terms 
on two women defendants. 
 
 
2005 & 2006 Sentencing Decisions About Aboriginal Women  
Convicted of Offenses Causing Death or Personal Injury57 
Case Most serious offense Sanction 
R. v. Spence [2006] M.J. 
No. 238. 
Impaired driving causing 
death 
2 years less 1 day 
conditional sentence. 
R. v. S.O.S. [2006] M.J.  
No. 146. Infanticide 
18 months conditional 
sentence 
R. v. Schoenthal [2006] 
S.J. No. 242. 
Criminal negligence 
causing death (23 month 
old son) 
30 months (federal) prison 
term. 
R. v. Pawis [2006] O.J. 
No. 4158. 
Aggravated assault (on 
nine-month old son) 
2 years less 1 day 
conditional sentence + 3 
years probation 
R. v. Kahypeasewat 
[2006] S.J. No. 587. Manslaughter 
2 years less 1 day 
conditional sentence + 2 
years probation 
R. v. Heavenfire [2006] 
A.J. No. 1062. 
Uttering threats + forcible 
entry (home invasion with 
3 co-defendants) 
Time served (eight 
months remand custody), 
1 day + 12 months 
probation. 
R. v. Lisa Gladue  [2006] 
A.J. No 1196. Aggravated assault 
18 months (provincial) 
prison term 
R. v. Diamond [2006] Aggravated assault  18 months conditional 
                                                          
available at 2006 ON.C. LEXIS 3206 (finding that both counsel and the trial judge failed to 
give appropriate consideration to legal requirements in Gladue). 
57
 For purposes of this research, I retrieved from one of the major electronic databases 
(Quicklaw Lexis-Nexis, Canadian judgments database cases decided in 2005 and 2006 in 
which an adult aboriginal woman appeared as the defendant. The search looked for cases in 
2005 and 2006 in which the terms “718.2” and “Aboriginal” and “words beginning ‘senten’” 
appeared, and 148 cases in 2006 and 146 cases in 2005 were retrieved. After eliminating cases 
about men and one case about a female Aboriginal youth, the sample consisted of 36 cases, 23 
in 2006 and 13 in 2005.  I then reviewed these cases to select only those decided at first 
instance where the defendant was Aboriginal, which yielded 11 cases in 2006 and 7 in 2005.  
Finally, I eliminated 4 cases where the offense did not cause death or personal injury. Not all 
sentencing decisions are published in the database; thus, the cases are presented as illustrative 
of themes rather than representative of sentencing decisions about Aboriginal women.  It 
seems that databases typically publish all of the cases they receive from first instance courts 
and from lawyers or court reporters, but judges, courts, lawyers, and court reporters do not 
send every case decided to the database.   
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Q.J. No.2711. sentence (after deducting 
6 months for remand 
custody) 
R. v. Byrd [2006] M.J. 
No. 102. Manslaughter 
2 years less 1 day 
conditional sentence + 2 
years probation 
R. v. W.L.Q. [2005] S.J. 
No. 13. Manslaughter 
36 months (federal) prison 
term after deducting 12 
 
months for remand 
custody 
R. v. Pépabano [2005] 
QJ. No. 19000. 
Impaired driving causing 
death 
42 months (federal) prison 
term 
R. v. Goodstoney58 
[2005] A.J. No. 1454. Second degree Murder  
Mandatory life 
imprisonment, 15 year 
parole ineligibility period 
R. v. C.M.A. [2005] Y.J. 
No. 98. Manslaughter 
36 months (federal) prison 
term, after deducting 24 
months for remand 
custody. 
R. v. Bone [2005] M.J. 
No. 75. 
Impaired driving causing 
death 
2 years less 1 day 
conditional sentence. 
 
As is apparent from the table, similar offenses may result in very different 
sanctions. Each of the five federally sentenced women had killed someone, and so 
had five women who received a conditional sentence.  Of these ten cases: two 
women convicted of manslaughter received federal sentences59 and two received 
conditional sentences;60 one federally sentenced61 and one conditionally sentenced62 
                                                                 
58R. v. Goodstoney involved a mandatory life imprisonment term imposed on a defendant 
convicted of second degree murder.  It was the only decision to be made at sentencing that 
concerned the minimum time the defendant had to serve before becoming eligible for parole 
consideration.  R. v. Goodstoney, No. 040193500-Q1, [2005] A.J. No. 1454, ¶ 23 (A.C.Q.B. 
June 20, 2005), available at 2005 AB.C. LEXIS 1771. 
59See R. v. C.M.A., No. 04-01527A, [2005] Y.J. No. 98 (Y.T.S.C. Nov. 4, 2005), 
available at 2005 BC.C. LEXIS 3671; R. v. W.L.Q., Nos. 1982 & 1983, [2005] S.J. No. 13 
(S.C.Q.B. Jan. 7, 2005), available at 2005 SK.C. LEXIS 13. 
60See R. v. Byrd, CR 04-01-25268, [2006] M.J. No. 102 (M.C.Q.B. Feb. 27, 2006), 
available at 2006 MB.C. LEXIS 102); R. v. Kahypeasewat, No. 43722164, [2006] S.J. No. 
587 (S.P.C. Aug. 24, 2006), available at 2006 SK.C. LEXIS 576). 
61See R. v. Schoenthal, CRIM643/2004, [2006] S.J. No. 242 (S.C.Q.B. Apr. 13, 2006), 
available at 2006 SK.C. LEXIS 241).  The court does not regard Ms. Schoenthal as an 
Aboriginal defendant, even though it notes that Ms. Schoenthal’s father is a Métis, one of the 
groups classified as Aboriginal in Canada.  Id. at ¶ 17.  Moreover, the circumstances of the 
offence are intertwined with Ms. Schoenthal’s relationship to members of an Aboriginal 
community.  Id. 
62See R. v. S.O.S., CR 03-01-24696, [2006] M.J. No. 146 (M.C.Q.B. Mar. 27, 2006), 
available at 2006 MB.C. LEXIS 144. 
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woman had killed her child; and one federally sentenced63 and two conditionally 
sentenced64 women had been convicted of impaired driving causing death. One 
woman convicted of aggravated assault received a fairly lengthy provincial prison 
term;65 two others were conditionally sentenced.66 Finally, two women convicted for 
their participation in a violent home invasion were credited with time already served 
in remand custody and placed on probation.67  
All of the defendants convicted of homicides and assaults knew the victims, as 
did at least two of the three impaired drivers.68  Most of the victims of violence were 
spouses or children, a finding consistent with numerous studies showing that 
women’s violence tends to be inflicted on family members.69  In some decisions, the 
relationship of the defendant to the victim, as spouse or parent, was specifically cited 
as an aggravating factor as per the Criminal Code.70  
Whether or not they imposed incarceration, most judges referred to the presence 
(or absence) of “unique systemic or background factors” as shaping the defendant’s 
identity and influencing the course of her life.71 The decisions catalog the 
defendant’s experiences of adult and childhood victimization, substance dependency, 
educational disadvantage, under or unemployment, dislocation, parental 
abandonment and family dysfunction. Such background information typically is 
taken from a supplement to the traditional pre-sentence report, satisfying the Gladue 
requirement that the particular circumstances of the individual Aboriginal defendant 
be specifically adduced and linked to the offense.  
More challenging for the courts than procedural dimensions of Gladue is the 
extent to which the “unique systematic or background factors” also represent aspects 
of identity and circumstances that penal practitioners classify as sources of 
criminogenic risks and needs.72  When presented as “Gladue factors,” considerations 
                                                                 
63See R. v. Pépabano, No. 200-10-001838-056, 70 W.C.B. (2d) 883 (Q.C.A. Apr. 11, 
2006), available at 2006 W.C.B.J. LEXIS 1798. . 
64See R. v. Bone, CR04-01-25525, [2005] M.J. No. 75 (M.C.Q.B. Feb. 22, 2005), 
available at 2005 MB.C. LEXIS 94; R. v. Spence, [2006] M.J. No. 238 (M.P.C. June 2, 2006), 
available at 2006 MB.C. LEXIS 234. 
65See R. v. Lisa Gladue, No. 041043068P1, [2006] A.J. No 1196 (A.P.C. July 18, 2006), 
available at 2006 AB.C. LEXIS 1267. 
66See R. v. Diamond, [2006] Q.J. No.2711; R. v. Pawis, No. 04-10006413-00, [2006] O.J. 
No. 4158 (O.C.J. Oct. 16, 2006), available at 2006 ON.C. LEXIS 4071. 
67See R. v. Heavenfire, No. 060419140P10101, [2006] A.J. No. 1062 (A.P.C. Aug. 22, 
2006), available at 2006 AB.C. LEXIS 1036. 
68See Pépabano, 70 W.C.B. (2d) at 883; Bone, [2005] M.J. No. 75. 
69See Brzozowski, supra note 54, at 6.  See generally ELIZABETH COMACK, WOMEN IN 
TROUBLE: CONNECTING WOMEN'S LAW VIOLATIONS TO THEIR HISTORIES OF ABUSE (1996). 
70Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§.718.2(a)(ii), (ii)(1) (1985). 
71Sentencing appeals, however, suggest that compliance with the Gladue sentencing 
methodology is still not universal.  See, e.g., R. v. Kakekagamick, [2006] O.J. No. 3346. 
72See Empowering Risk, supra note 15, at 250-66; KELLY HANNAH-MOFFAT & MARGARET 
SHAW, TAKING RISKS: INCORPORATING GENDER AND CULTURE INTO THE CLASSIFICATION AND 
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such as unemployment, under-education, family dysfunction, and substance 
dependency function as a reason not to incarcerate Aboriginal defendants, but when 
regarded as criminogenic risk/needs they may serve as justifications for prison terms 
to contain the threat the defendant poses and custodial correctional programming to 
ameliorate it.   
Cases in which judges imposed a non-carceral sanction illustrate different ways 
of resolving the conflicting demands of decision-making based on risk/need and the 
requirement to respond to the defendant’s experience of life located at the 
intersections of multiple subordinating relations. One case construed the sanction as 
a form of healing rather than a punitive intervention in the defendant’s life, with the 
judge holding that a conditional sentence aimed at accomplishing restorative justice 
would facilitate the defendant’s reintegration, reduce the risk that she poses, and 
enhance community safety.73  This judge did not impose punitive restrictions on the 
defendant’s liberty, and the decision limited the discretionary requirements of the 
conditional sentence to programs that were believed to be conducive to rehabilitation 
of the defendant in the community. This case may have viewed the defendant’s 
social context as indicative of elevated criminogenic risk/need, but the judge 
followed the Gladue approach of finding that a restorative sanction is more suitable 
than a punitive one in part because it is more likely to reduce risk.  
A more common strategy involved emphasizing the capacity of the non-carceral 
sanction to punish, rather than its healing potential, and in these cases judges tend to 
focus more specifically on how the risk the defendant reputedly posed would be 
managed in the community. Judges employing this approach often constructed the 
defendant as less dangerous than the risk factors seemed to suggest, deciding that 
regardless of the nature of the offense and no matter what the defendant’s social 
context appeared to indicate about her level of criminogenic risk/need, her behavior 
generally did not mark her as a threat to society.  Some of these judges found ways 
to treat the offense as an aberration, often linking it to an unhealthy, dangerous 
relationship;74 and they noted where defendants had avoided significant lawbreaking 
until the offense for which she was sentenced75 or even for a substantial period of 
time, such as during a lengthy interval between charge and trial.76  In other cases, 
judges imposed a conditional sentence despite finding that the defendant’s social 
context signified a non-trivial level of risk, justifying the decision on the basis of the 
capacity of the community, through close watching and monitoring, to contain the 
risk that the defendant posed.77   
When responding to a construction of the defendant as a containable risk, judges 
generally characterized the non-carceral sanction as meeting punitive objectives of 
                                                          
ASSESSMENT OF FEDERALLY SENTENCED WOMEN IN CANADA (2001), available at 
http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/pubs/pubspr/0662654323/200103_0662654323_e.pdf.   
73See R. v. S.O.S., CR 03-01-24696, [2006] M.J. No. 146 (M.C.Q.B. Mar. 27, 2006), 
available at 2006 MB.C. LEXIS 144). 
74See Kahypeasewat, [2006] S.J. No. 587; Byrd, [2006] M.J. No. 102; Heavenfire, [2006] 
A.J. No. 1062. 
75See Pawis, [2006] O.J. No. 4158; Bone, [2005] M.J. No. 75. 
76See Spence, [2006] M.J. No. 238. 
77See Byrd, [2006] M.J. No. 102. 
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deterrence and denunciation and then reinforced the punitive dimension through long 
terms and the imposition of highly restrictive punitive conditions, such as substantial 
periods of home confinement. Thus, five of the seven conditional sentences in the 
sample are initially maximum terms of two-years-less-a-day, (with two somewhat 
reduced because of time served on remand) and one is an  eighteen-month term;78 all 
except one include a home confinement term. Most judges who imposed a 
conditional sentence added on a substantial period of probation, with the result that 
the defendant was to remain under state supervision for several years, certainly 
longer than if she had received a provincial prison term and likely for more time than 
if she had been sentenced to federal custody. Conditional sentences such as these 
potentially may result in more incarceration than the custodial sanctions they replace 
because the longer the conditional term and the more stringent its conditions, the 
greater the opportunity for the defendant to breach and the more likely it is that 
breach will occur. Custody does not automatically follow from breach but it is the 
presumed sanction and courts have held that defendants incarcerated for breach of a 
conditional sentence should serve the entire remaining term in custody without the 
benefit of parole or remission. 
Unsurprisingly, criminogenic risks and punitive objectives tend to feature 
prominently in cases where the defendant received a custodial term rather than a 
conditional sentence. In some of these cases, the judges seemed to ignore or 
minimize the defendant’s identity as an Aboriginal woman;79 in others, the very same 
background factors that constituted the defendant’s identity as an Aboriginal woman 
and explained her appearance before the court also rendered her risky and needy.80 
More interesting than the conventional approach of incarcerating the defendant to 
denounce and deter her and to keep society safe,81 are decisions in which judges give 
significant weight to reintegration and restorative justice in their reasons for 
responding to the defendant’s criminogenic/risk needs with a lengthy carceral term.82 
These cases construct the prison at least to some extent as a therapeutic environment, 
a place of safety, healing, and growth for a defendant whose life in the community 
marks her as both victimizer and victimized. This theme features prominently in 
W.L.Q., a spousal manslaughter case in which the reasons for sentence describe Ms. 
W.L.Q’s “highly dysfunctional” childhood, which included a long history of 
suffering extreme sexual abuse, and detail her adult experience of severe substance 
dependency and a long history of “mutual assaults” and other abuse that 
characterized her relationships with the man she killed.83 Noting that Ms. W.L.Q.’s 
“family members are all in recovery themselves and would like to support W.L.Q. in 
her effort to do the same,” the judge concludes that “W.L.Q.’s best opportunities to 
obtain the help that she needs to have is through the programs offered in the Federal 
Female Corrections Institution system including the Edmonton Institution for 
                                                                 
78See S.O.S., [2006] M.J. No. 146. 
79See Schoenthal, [2006] S.J. No. 242. 
80See Gladue, [2006] A.J. No 1196. 
81See, e.g., Schoenthal, [2006] S.J. No. 242; Pépabano, 70 W.C.B. (2d) 883. 
82See W.L.Q., [2005] S.J. No. 13; C.M.A., [2005] Y.J. No. 98;Gladue, [2006] A.J. No 
1196. 
83W.L.Q., [2005] S.J. No. 13, ¶ 12-22. 
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Women.”84 According to this judge, federal imprisonment is not a punitive 
alternative to restorative justice but a means of achieving the restorative and re-
integrative objectives of the defendant accepting responsibility, acknowledging 
harm, and achieving rehabilitation.85  
III.  CONCLUSION 
Clearly, more research and analysis are required before we have a fuller 
understanding of why § 718.2(e) and the Gladue sentencing methodology have failed 
Aboriginal women so abjectly. But this brief discussion has illuminated some critical 
issues. While this study has found that judges generally attempt to apply the Gladue 
methodology by situating the defendant and her offense in their social context, it also 
has shown that this type of analysis may have problematic effects. First, there is a 
danger of social context analysis portraying lawbreaking by Aboriginal women as 
over-determined by ancestry, identity and circumstances, thereby feeding stereotypes 
about criminality that render the stereotyped group more vulnerable to 
criminalization. This focus on the Aboriginal woman’s personal history family, and 
community shifts attention away from questions about societal discrimination and 
exclusion and about the role of criminalization and penal practice in exacerbating the 
problems of Aboriginal societies and individuals. The social and economic relations 
and the legal regimes that maintain the subordination of Aboriginal peoples in 
Canada are no more than the faintest of backdrops to the decisions.  
Second, the association of the “unique systemic and background factors” of the 
Gladue methodology with the criminogenic risk/needs of contemporary penal 
practice complicates the task of employing social contextualization to reduce the 
incarceration of Aboriginal women. When faced with an Aboriginal woman who 
embodies what are perceived to be significant criminogenic risk/needs, the 
sentencing judge is asked to justify a non-carceral sanction in terms of those same 
aspects of the defendant’s context that point to incarceration as necessary to contain 
and manage her risk of re-offending.  While some judges may resolve the 
contradictory thrusts of risk and restraint in favor of community-based sanctions, 
social context analysis does not compel such a conclusion.  
Although sentencing can play no more than a limited role in keeping Aboriginal 
people out of prison, a project that requires substantial investment in the social and 
economic development needs of Aboriginal individuals and societies, and may 
indeed not be fully realized until Aboriginal societies have achieved a greater 
measure of autonomy from the Canadian state,86 one can expect penal practices 
including sentencing to make some contribution towards reduced incarceration, or at 
least to not make matters worse. If social context analysis cannot fulfill its promise 
of lowering incarceration rates, then we perhaps need to make space for new 
approaches that focus more explicitly on the failures of imprisonment than on the 
                                                                 
84Id. ¶¶ 34-35. 
85
 Id. ¶ 33.  In C.M.A., another spousal manslaughter case featuring substance abuse, a 
mutually abusive relationship, and alcohol abuse by the defendant and the deceased, the judge 
also characterised the prison as a place of healing.  Id. ¶ 20. However, in this case, the 
restorative objectives seem to be subordinated to the punitive objectives that the judge also 
cites.  Id. ¶¶ 23-25. 
86RCAP, supra note 23. 
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failings of the individual. In 2003, Jonathan Rudin and Kent Roach concluded their 
passionate defense of § 718.2(e) with the prediction that “[a]t some point in the 
future, it tragically may be necessary to criticize § 718.2(e) and Gladue as ineffectual 
in reducing Aboriginal over-representation in prison.”87 That point in the future is 
now.  
                                                                 
87Rudin & Roach, supra note 47, at 34. 
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007
